Serdar Yurtçiçek||The international system through China’s eyes: An in-depth interview with academics in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Beijing
创建时间：  2025-04-13     浏览次数：

The international system through China’s eyes: An in-depth interview with academics in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Beijing


In recent days, I had the opportunity to set out from Shanghai—one of China’s most vibrant and intellectually rich cities—and revisit Hangzhou and Beijing. These cities are home to China’s most prestigious universities and provide an ideal setting for gauging the pulse of academic circles. With Donald Trump’s re-election in the United States reigniting trade wars through heightened tariffs, the growing turbulence in the international system, and China’s position in this emerging world order, I engaged in extensive conversations with Chinese academics. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, these scholars offered candid insights into China’s foreign policy and the global balance of power. The questions are mine, while the responses come directly from these academics.


From Shanghai to Beijing: China’s academic community speaks


China’s role in the international system has been a frequent topic of debate in both the West and the East in recent years. The escalating trade wars spurred by Trump’s tariffs and a world order shaken by conflicts like Ukraine-Russia and Palestine-Israel have once again placed China under the global spotlight. During my discussions with leading academics from universities in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Beijing, I sought to understand how China views this chaotic landscape and where it positions itself within it.


‘China keeps its distance from conflicts, but it’s a strategic choice’


The first striking aspect of China’s foreign policy is its cautious stance toward conflicts beyond its borders. According to the academics, China justifies this approach with its principles of “non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs” and “non-involvement in disputes between third parties.” However, I posed a pointed question: “Isn’t the root cause of these wars the power vacuum in the international system? If the U.S. were as strong as it once was, would conflicts like Russia-Ukraine or Palestine-Israel be as widespread? Doesn’t China bear some responsibility for the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world order? If so, how logical is it for China, as a partial architect of this turbulence, to stand on the sidelines?”


One academic responded decisively: “Yes, it benefits China. The U.S. is no longer as powerful as it once was and is steadily weakening. Constantly engaged in wars, the U.S. is losing both prestige in the international community and economic ground. This situation works against the U.S. and in China’s favor.” I countered with an objection: “But doesn’t it seem like China is losing ground too? Russia and Iran paid heavy prices in Syria over the years, yet China couldn’t even economically support Syria’s reconstruction. Had it done so, might the Assad regime have survived? With Russia tied up in Ukraine and Iran clashing with Israel, Assad was left unsupported and fell. Moreover, groups like the Turkistan Islamic Party have gained strength in Syria and may soon have the capacity to establish a state. Can anyone guarantee that these groups won’t one day target China’s Xinjiang region?”


The academic acknowledged my concern: “Yes, what you say is partly true. Assad had lost the support of his people, and a leader who loses that support will inevitably fall, one way or another. But for China, the real threat isn’t the jihadist groups themselves—it’s the powers backing them. If China is ever forced to fight—and that would truly be a last resort—it would confront not the terrorist organizations, but the forces behind them. China doesn’t approve of Russia’s approach in Ukraine and is pursuing a different path.”


‘Russia made a mistake, China doesn’t favor proxy wars’


Curious about this “different path,” I pressed further: “What do you mean?” The academic’s response was striking: “Russia, with the largest landmass in the world, claimed its goal in Ukraine was to counter groups attempting ethnic cleansing of Russians—which was a legitimate concern. But it did what it swore it wouldn’t: it annexed the territory of a sovereign state. China, on the other hand, hasn’t launched a military operation even in Taiwan, which is internationally recognized as part of our territory. That’s because the people of Taiwan are our people; we seek peaceful reunification, and it will happen eventually. If an operation over Taiwan occurs, it won’t be between China and the island—it will be between China and the powers that support it behind.  China doesn’t engage in proxy wars.”


This response hinted at a red line in China’s approach to conflicts. “So, does that mean China will ignore global conflicts until they reach its borders?” I asked. The academic clarified: “No, of course we’ll raise our voice. We’ll stand against imperialism and with the oppressed. But we won’t be drawn into direct conflict as the U.S. wants. We do not want to jump into the trap that set by the U.S..We’re not ready for that now, but we’re preparing. Look at history: Britain won both world wars but lost all its strength. The U.S., entering both wars late, emerged fresh and energetic, securing victory and becoming the architect of the new world order. China is gathering its energy and strength today. Meanwhile, the U.S. is repeating Britain’s mistake—constantly fighting and wearing itself out.”


‘Waiting for the right moment is China’s strategy’


But isn’t there a limit to this “energy-gathering” strategy? “What happens if you lose all strategic points to the U.S. in the meantime?” I asked. The academic offered a historical perspective: “As Chinese, we, like the Turks, prefer to move forward with historical references. During international crises, we focus on resolving our internal issues and border disputes—it’s a form of preparation for the larger battle. Take the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, for example. While the world was fixated on the U.S. and the Soviet Union, we settled our issue with India in one month. No one even noticed. Of course, no Chinese can figure out why the India launched a war with China first. Similarly, in 1979, amidst the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Second Oil Crisis, we are forced to start the Counterattack in Self-Defense on the Sino-Vietnamese Border, we entered Vietnam, achieved our goals swiftly, and withdrew. Timing is important for China.”


In short, while its adversaries fight, China builds its strength, preparing to defend itself when the moment is right. So when might that moment come? “At what point would China shift from rhetoric to action?” I asked. The answer was clear: “Maybe Iran, or maybe the direct attack from U.S.. Iran is so important for the safety of Central Asia and China. We oppose intervention in a sovereign state. Just as the U.S. supported Ukraine against Russia, we would support Iran anyway.”


‘Until 2030, a period of conflict and cooperation’


The academics also shared a long-term vision for China’s relationship with the U.S. “Until 2030, China will adopt a strategy of engaging the U.S. without entering direct conflict,” they said. They describe this period as one of “conflict and cooperation”, but maybe the most intense and dangerous period compared with the next 10-20 years. The reasoning lies in China’s domestic priorities: “Our western provinces are still underdeveloped. Until China completes its overall development, it won’t risk a direct confrontation. Militarily, we don’t want to be part of a conflict, nor do we think we’re ready for one. But after 2030, the gap between China and the U.S. will be reduced to a large degree and the balance will be in China’s favor. By then, we believe the U.S. won’t dare risk a direct conflict either. If they do venture into such ‘madness,’ China will be ready.”


‘China won’t kneel to Trump’s tariffs’


When the topic turned to Trump’s tariffs, the academic was resolute: “We’ll see it through to the end. In 2018, we didn’t immediately retaliate to the U.S.’s tariffs on China, but things are different now. We didn’t start this trade war, and we won’t bow to the U.S.”


Russia-U.S. agreement and new alliances


I also asked about the possibility of a Russia-U.S. deal: “It was said that China and Russia’s partnership had no limits—does that still hold?” The academic replied: “But there is a bottom line for the relations. China has never seen Russia as an enemy. We understand the security rationale behind its intervention in Ukraine, but we’ve always supported a sovereign state’s territorial integrity. If Russia strikes a deal with the U.S., that’s their choice. According to the official documents, China has no allies. The only ally China has maybe the North Korea because of the Korean War.”


Finally, I touched on recent developments: “Last month, Russia blamed European states for world wars, avoiding mention of the U.S. Trump suggests he could reach an agreement with Russia. Meanwhile, tariffs seem to be bringing China and Europe closer. Just last week, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited China, emphasizing cooperation. Could we see a China-EU alliance pitted against a U.S.-Russia bloc in the near future?” The academic didn’t rule it out: “There are no eternal friendships or enmities. It’s possible. And with potential land and rail links between China and the EU, the strategic importance of Central Asia and Turkey grows. Turkey’s geopolitical position and ties with Central Asia could make it a key partner for China.”


Conclusion: China’s strategic patience and future plans


This interview with Chinese academics reveals Beijing’s patient, strategic, and long-term approach to the turbulence in the international system. By steering clear of conflicts and building its strength, China aims to avoid direct confrontation until 2030, even 2035, 2049 while completing its development. The academics predict that, post-2030, China’s advantage over the U.S. will grow, preparing it for any potential conflict. A critical key country like Iran or a strategic issue like Taiwan could prompt China to act sooner. In the face of Trump’s trade wars, China stands firm: it won’t back down. Meanwhile, emerging partnerships like Russia-U.S. and China-EU, potentially involving Turkey, hint at a global realignment. Time will tell what role China ultimately plays in this chaotic world.


来源：https://harici.com.tr/en/the-international-system-through-chinas-eyes-an-in-depth-interview-with-academics-in-shanghai-hangzhou-and-beijing/






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Serdar Yurtçiçek||The international system through China’s eyes: An in-depth interview with academics in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Beijing
创建时间：  2025-04-13     浏览次数：

The international system through China’s eyes: An in-depth interview with academics in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Beijing


In recent days, I had the opportunity to set out from Shanghai—one of China’s most vibrant and intellectually rich cities—and revisit Hangzhou and Beijing. These cities are home to China’s most prestigious universities and provide an ideal setting for gauging the pulse of academic circles. With Donald Trump’s re-election in the United States reigniting trade wars through heightened tariffs, the growing turbulence in the international system, and China’s position in this emerging world order, I engaged in extensive conversations with Chinese academics. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, these scholars offered candid insights into China’s foreign policy and the global balance of power. The questions are mine, while the responses come directly from these academics.


From Shanghai to Beijing: China’s academic community speaks


China’s role in the international system has been a frequent topic of debate in both the West and the East in recent years. The escalating trade wars spurred by Trump’s tariffs and a world order shaken by conflicts like Ukraine-Russia and Palestine-Israel have once again placed China under the global spotlight. During my discussions with leading academics from universities in Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Beijing, I sought to understand how China views this chaotic landscape and where it positions itself within it.


‘China keeps its distance from conflicts, but it’s a strategic choice’


The first striking aspect of China’s foreign policy is its cautious stance toward conflicts beyond its borders. According to the academics, China justifies this approach with its principles of “non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs” and “non-involvement in disputes between third parties.” However, I posed a pointed question: “Isn’t the root cause of these wars the power vacuum in the international system? If the U.S. were as strong as it once was, would conflicts like Russia-Ukraine or Palestine-Israel be as widespread? Doesn’t China bear some responsibility for the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar world order? If so, how logical is it for China, as a partial architect of this turbulence, to stand on the sidelines?”


One academic responded decisively: “Yes, it benefits China. The U.S. is no longer as powerful as it once was and is steadily weakening. Constantly engaged in wars, the U.S. is losing both prestige in the international community and economic ground. This situation works against the U.S. and in China’s favor.” I countered with an objection: “But doesn’t it seem like China is losing ground too? Russia and Iran paid heavy prices in Syria over the years, yet China couldn’t even economically support Syria’s reconstruction. Had it done so, might the Assad regime have survived? With Russia tied up in Ukraine and Iran clashing with Israel, Assad was left unsupported and fell. Moreover, groups like the Turkistan Islamic Party have gained strength in Syria and may soon have the capacity to establish a state. Can anyone guarantee that these groups won’t one day target China’s Xinjiang region?”


The academic acknowledged my concern: “Yes, what you say is partly true. Assad had lost the support of his people, and a leader who loses that support will inevitably fall, one way or another. But for China, the real threat isn’t the jihadist groups themselves—it’s the powers backing them. If China is ever forced to fight—and that would truly be a last resort—it would confront not the terrorist organizations, but the forces behind them. China doesn’t approve of Russia’s approach in Ukraine and is pursuing a different path.”


‘Russia made a mistake, China doesn’t favor proxy wars’


Curious about this “different path,” I pressed further: “What do you mean?” The academic’s response was striking: “Russia, with the largest landmass in the world, claimed its goal in Ukraine was to counter groups attempting ethnic cleansing of Russians—which was a legitimate concern. But it did what it swore it wouldn’t: it annexed the territory of a sovereign state. China, on the other hand, hasn’t launched a military operation even in Taiwan, which is internationally recognized as part of our territory. That’s because the people of Taiwan are our people; we seek peaceful reunification, and it will happen eventually. If an operation over Taiwan occurs, it won’t be between China and the island—it will be between China and the powers that support it behind.  China doesn’t engage in proxy wars.”


This response hinted at a red line in China’s approach to conflicts. “So, does that mean China will ignore global conflicts until they reach its borders?” I asked. The academic clarified: “No, of course we’ll raise our voice. We’ll stand against imperialism and with the oppressed. But we won’t be drawn into direct conflict as the U.S. wants. We do not want to jump into the trap that set by the U.S..We’re not ready for that now, but we’re preparing. Look at history: Britain won both world wars but lost all its strength. The U.S., entering both wars late, emerged fresh and energetic, securing victory and becoming the architect of the new world order. China is gathering its energy and strength today. Meanwhile, the U.S. is repeating Britain’s mistake—constantly fighting and wearing itself out.”


‘Waiting for the right moment is China’s strategy’


But isn’t there a limit to this “energy-gathering” strategy? “What happens if you lose all strategic points to the U.S. in the meantime?” I asked. The academic offered a historical perspective: “As Chinese, we, like the Turks, prefer to move forward with historical references. During international crises, we focus on resolving our internal issues and border disputes—it’s a form of preparation for the larger battle. Take the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, for example. While the world was fixated on the U.S. and the Soviet Union, we settled our issue with India in one month. No one even noticed. Of course, no Chinese can figure out why the India launched a war with China first. Similarly, in 1979, amidst the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Second Oil Crisis, we are forced to start the Counterattack in Self-Defense on the Sino-Vietnamese Border, we entered Vietnam, achieved our goals swiftly, and withdrew. Timing is important for China.”


In short, while its adversaries fight, China builds its strength, preparing to defend itself when the moment is right. So when might that moment come? “At what point would China shift from rhetoric to action?” I asked. The answer was clear: “Maybe Iran, or maybe the direct attack from U.S.. Iran is so important for the safety of Central Asia and China. We oppose intervention in a sovereign state. Just as the U.S. supported Ukraine against Russia, we would support Iran anyway.”


‘Until 2030, a period of conflict and cooperation’


The academics also shared a long-term vision for China’s relationship with the U.S. “Until 2030, China will adopt a strategy of engaging the U.S. without entering direct conflict,” they said. They describe this period as one of “conflict and cooperation”, but maybe the most intense and dangerous period compared with the next 10-20 years. The reasoning lies in China’s domestic priorities: “Our western provinces are still underdeveloped. Until China completes its overall development, it won’t risk a direct confrontation. Militarily, we don’t want to be part of a conflict, nor do we think we’re ready for one. But after 2030, the gap between China and the U.S. will be reduced to a large degree and the balance will be in China’s favor. By then, we believe the U.S. won’t dare risk a direct conflict either. If they do venture into such ‘madness,’ China will be ready.”


‘China won’t kneel to Trump’s tariffs’


When the topic turned to Trump’s tariffs, the academic was resolute: “We’ll see it through to the end. In 2018, we didn’t immediately retaliate to the U.S.’s tariffs on China, but things are different now. We didn’t start this trade war, and we won’t bow to the U.S.”


Russia-U.S. agreement and new alliances


I also asked about the possibility of a Russia-U.S. deal: “It was said that China and Russia’s partnership had no limits—does that still hold?” The academic replied: “But there is a bottom line for the relations. China has never seen Russia as an enemy. We understand the security rationale behind its intervention in Ukraine, but we’ve always supported a sovereign state’s territorial integrity. If Russia strikes a deal with the U.S., that’s their choice. According to the official documents, China has no allies. The only ally China has maybe the North Korea because of the Korean War.”


Finally, I touched on recent developments: “Last month, Russia blamed European states for world wars, avoiding mention of the U.S. Trump suggests he could reach an agreement with Russia. Meanwhile, tariffs seem to be bringing China and Europe closer. Just last week, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited China, emphasizing cooperation. Could we see a China-EU alliance pitted against a U.S.-Russia bloc in the near future?” The academic didn’t rule it out: “There are no eternal friendships or enmities. It’s possible. And with potential land and rail links between China and the EU, the strategic importance of Central Asia and Turkey grows. Turkey’s geopolitical position and ties with Central Asia could make it a key partner for China.”


Conclusion: China’s strategic patience and future plans


This interview with Chinese academics reveals Beijing’s patient, strategic, and long-term approach to the turbulence in the international system. By steering clear of conflicts and building its strength, China aims to avoid direct confrontation until 2030, even 2035, 2049 while completing its development. The academics predict that, post-2030, China’s advantage over the U.S. will grow, preparing it for any potential conflict. A critical key country like Iran or a strategic issue like Taiwan could prompt China to act sooner. In the face of Trump’s trade wars, China stands firm: it won’t back down. Meanwhile, emerging partnerships like Russia-U.S. and China-EU, potentially involving Turkey, hint at a global realignment. Time will tell what role China ultimately plays in this chaotic world.


来源：https://harici.com.tr/en/the-international-system-through-chinas-eyes-an-in-depth-interview-with-academics-in-shanghai-hangzhou-and-beijing/






下一条：佩尼尔登·席尔瓦·菲略｜国际形势与巴西2025年面临的挑战